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NOTE
SACKETT V. EPA: THE MURKY CONFLUENCE OF DUE
PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLIANCE ORDERS
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Jonathan D. Satert
I. INTRODUCTION

Private property rights are some of the most fundamental and important
rights that American citizens possess and cherish.' Americans have a long
tradition and history of private property rights that can be traced back to
the Magna Carta.2 The American people decided to specifically mention
private property right protections in the Constitution by enacting the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 Today, property
rights face threats on numerous fronts.' One of the most serious of these
threats is overzealous enforcement of far-reaching environmental laws by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Army Corps of
t Marketing Director, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 7. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2013); B.A., Political Science, Thomas Edison State
College (2007). The author would like to acknowledge and thank the family members,
friends, mentors, teachers, and professors, but especially his parents, Ron and Diane Sater,
that have invested in his life and inspired him to do all for the glory of God. This Note would
not have been possible without them. Soli Deo Gloria.
1. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that
the nation values due process and private property).
2.

See

BERNARD

H.

SIEGAN,

PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

FROM

MAGNA

CARTA TO THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1-2 (2001) (quoting Supreme Court Justices Joseph Bradley and

John Harlan discussing the rights of Englishmen that Americans inherited, among which is
the right of property).
3. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause states, "nor shall any person ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause states, "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477, 490 (2005) (5-4 decision)
("[A] city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the
'public use' requirement of the Fifth Amendment."). In 1983, Professor Harold Berman
declared that the Western legal tradition is at a turning point. HAROLD J.BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 36 (1983). One aspect of

this is that there has been "a break with its emphasis on private property and freedom of
contract." Id.
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Engineers ("the Corps").' These environmental agencies are bringing more
individuals and businesses within the reach of environmental laws, such as
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),' by arbitrarily increasing the jurisdictional
reach of those laws.7 This unapologetic power grab has been disastrous for
many unfortunate people, businesses, and even government entities.'
Imagine you are an ordinary, middle-class American citizen.9 After
acquiring a residential lot with a view of a scenic lake, you and your spouse
finally begin taking the steps to realize your dream of building your own
modest home. You first acquire all of the necessary building permits. Next,
the site preparation of filling and grading begins. Shortly thereafter,
however, federal agents sent by the EPA suddenly arrive without warning
and demand that work stop immediately because you have filled in a
wetland"o subject to the CWA without a permit. The EPA maintains this
5. Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due Process Deficit in
Environmental Law, 11 CATO SUPREME COURT REV. 139, 149 (2012) [hereinafter Wetlands]
("Given both agencies' history of overzealous assertions of their own authority, one could
excuse landowners for doubting the jurisdictional claim made by an agency enforcer-yet
acting on such doubts could have serious legal and financial consequences, as the Sacketts
discovered."). "Of all federal programs, however, the federal regulation of wetlands under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act is arguably the single most expansive federal regulation
of private land use." Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, with Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE
ESSAYS 82 (Vt. Law Sch. ed., 2007) [hereinafter Limits of CWA Jurisdiction], available at
http://www.vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS10004.pdf.
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2012).

7. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("Unsurprisingly,
the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers interpreted the phrase ['the waters of the United
States'] as an essentially limitless grant of authority.").
8. Press Release, Sen. Rand Paul, Today: Senator Paul Hosts Roundtable Forum
"Property Wrongs: A Discussion with Victims of the U.S. Government's Assault on Private
Property (Oct. 12, 2011) (summarizing the testimony of various individuals, businesses, and
government entities that have suffered greatly from oppressive enforcement actions by the
EPA and other agencies), available at http://www.randpaul2016.com/2011/10/todaysenator-paul-hosts-roundtable-forum-%E2%80%9Cproperty-wrongs-a-discussion-withvictims-of-the-u-s-government%E2%80%99s-assault-on-private-propertyE2%80%9D/.
9. This hypothetically posed scenario is an expansion of a similarly hypothetically
posed scenario in Sackett v. EPA. Fact Sheet, PAc. LEGAL FOUND. 1,
http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.doc?id=566 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) [hereinafter
Fact Sheet].
10. By regulation, the environmental agencies have included "wetlands" as a part of the
"waters of the United States," thereby subjecting them to CWA jurisdiction. See 33
U.S.C. 5 1362(7) (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7) (2012). The
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contention despite the absence of standing water or a continuous flow of
water-such as a spring or creek-off of your property. Moreover, the EPA
has not required any of your neighbors to obtain a permit to fill a
"wetland."
Convinced that you have done everything right and that the EPA is
mistaken, you request a written statement of the wrong you allegedly
committed and an opportunity to contest the decision. In the meantime,
you hire an engineer who determines that the property does not contain
any wetlands. After waiting several months for a formal, written reply, the
EPA sends you an administrative compliance order ("ACO"). The order
requires you to remove all of the dirt and gravel; restore your property to its
original condition, including replanting lost vegetation; allow the EPA to
monitor your property for three years; and allow EPA officials free access to
your property, while you must leave it undisturbed. The EPA further
informs you that only after you have fully complied with the order may you
then apply for the necessary permit to undo all of the work required by the
ACO. If you fail to comply with the order, you face potential civil penalties
of up to $75,000 per day as well as potential criminal penalties. Complying
with the order, however, will cost you $27,000, which is more than what you
paid for the lot. Furthermore, the EPA denies you any kind of hearing or
opportunity to contest its decision. EPA bureaucrats also inform you that
you cannot ask a court to review their determinations. Outraged, yet
devastated, you are at a loss what to do. In the words of Justice Alito, "most
ordinary homeowners would say this kind of thing can't happen in the
United States.""
In 2007, Mike and Chantell Sackett found themselves facing this exact
dilemma.12 They decided to fight the EPA in court. The District Court of
Code of Federal Regulations, however, does not further define the term "wetlands."
According to the Sacketts, "Wetlands are themselves defined by complex criteria [explained
in the 143-page Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation Manual]-including soil type,
vegetation, and hydrology-which defy consistent application and are not apparent to the
average citizen." Brief for Petitioners at 4, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 101062), 2011 WL 4500687 at *4 (footnote omitted). The environmental agencies have even
found wetlands "on land that appears to be totally dry." Id. For a historical summary of the
evolution of the federal regulations defining and regulating wetlands-from prohibitions on
walking through a wetland to the "glancing goose" test-see Wetlands, supra note 5, at 14149.
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (No. 10-1062)
[hereinafter Transcript].
12. While the literature on this subject matter often refers to this dilemma as a
"Hobson's choice," the use of that phrase is somewhat imprecise. See Andrew I. Davis,
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Idaho sided with the EPA by granting its motion to dismiss." On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed." On June 28, 2011, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine two issues: (1) whether the
Administrative Procedure Acts ("APA") precludes pre-enforcement
judicial review of ACOs, and (2) if the APA does preclude it, whether the
unavailability of pre-enforcement judicial review is a violation of due
process."6 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the APA
does not preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of ACOs.1 With this
ruling, the Sacketts will finally have their day in court.18 Despite yet another
setback for the EPA and the Corps, it appears that they are once again
skirting the Supreme Court's ruling, as they have in the past, by continuing
to subject other private property owners and businesses to their arbitrary
exercise of authority. 9
The EPA and the Corps, however, are not entirely at fault for the
confusion and heartache they cause private property owners by abusing
their rule-making and enforcement powers under the CWA. Congress is
also at fault: first, for granting the EPA and the Corps this broad,
discretionary power and second, for not reining them in. By failing to
define the phrase "waters of the United States," Congress further muddied
JudicialReview of Environmental Compliance Orders,24 ENVTL. L. 189, 211 (1994) (using the
phrase "Hobson's choice" to describe dilemmas where a party is forced to choose between
"costly compliance or the threat of penalties"); Christopher M. Wynn, Facing a Hobson's
Choice? The Constitutionality of the EPA's Administrative Compliance Order Enforcement
Scheme Under the Clean Air Act, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1879 (2005). The Third Circuit
explained the origin of the phrase: "Liveryman Thomas Hobson, who died in 1630 at the age
of eighty-five or eighty-six, obliged customers 'to take the horse which stood near the stable
door' or none at all." Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1084 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989)
(quoting STEELE, THE SPECTATOR, no. 509, Oct. 14, 1712). The phrase means "[n]o real choice
at all-the only options being to either accept or refuse the offer that is given to you," i.e.,
take it or leave it. The Meaning and Origin of the Expression: Hobson's Choice, THE PHRASE
FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/hobsons-choice.html
(last visited Feb. 22,
2013). The dilemma faced by the Sacketts and similarly situated individuals is not a take-itor-leave-it choice but rather a lesser-of-two-evils choice.
13. Sackett v. EPA, No. 08-cv-185-N-EJL, 2008 WL 3286801, at *3 (D. Idaho Aug. 7,
2008), affd, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
14. Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012).
16. Sackett v. EPA, 131 S. Ct. 3092 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011) (mem.).
17. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
18. Id.
19. See infra note 154; infra Part III.A.3.
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the waters.20 Going even further back, Congress originally created this
murky situation when it passed the APA. 2 1 The APA was a compromise
measure passed in response to the conservative congressmen's reaction to
President Roosevelt's New Deal and the accompanying administrative
22
regime. The New Dealers' goal of administrative "efficiency" threatened
individual rights and caused conservatives to push for administrative
reform to protect those rights.23 Congress's supposed purpose for passing
the APA was to balance these two competing objectives. Since the APA's
passage, however, "efficiency" has triumphed over individual rights.2 5 Lying
at the bottom of these murky legal waters is § 701(a) of the APA. 26 This
provision allows subsequent statutes to preclude judicial review of agency
actions taken to enforce that statute.27 Courts have interpreted § 701(a) to
mean that the statute can preclude judicial review explicitly or implicitly if

20. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
Congress... should have... in the first place[] provide[d] a reasonably clear
rule regarding the reach of the Clean Water Act. When Congress passed the
Clean Water Act in 1972, it provided that the Act covers "the waters of the
United States." But Congress did not define what it meant by "the waters of the
United States"; the phrase was not a term of art with a known meaning; and the
words themselves are hopelessly indeterminate. Unsurprisingly, the EPA and
the Army Corps of Engineers interpreted the phrase as an essentially limitless
grant of authority.
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted). "Scalia joked in summarizing
the decision from the bench that the Sacketts were surprised by the EPA's decision that their land
contained 'waters of the United States,' since they had 'never seen a ship or other vessel cross
their yard."' Robert Barnes and Juliet Eilperin, Supreme Court Allows Idaho Couple to Challenge
EPA

on

Wetlands

Ruling,

WASH.

POST,

Mar.

21,

2012,

available

at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-allows-idaho-couple-to-challengeepaon-wetlands-rulng/2012/03/21/gIQAFgdsRS.story.html?wprss%02rss..politics.
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012).
22. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emergesfrom New Deal Politics,90 Nw. U. L.REV. 1557, 1558-61 (1996).
23. Id. at 1680.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 1681-83. Shepherd notes, "In most respects, the administration won the
battle" over the nature of the APA, and "[t]he administration's interpretation [of the APA]
has prevailed." Id. at 1681-82.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 701.
27. See id. ("This chapter applies ... except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude
judicial review.. . ."); Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1142-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the CWA impliedly precludes judicial review), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
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"congressional intent . . . is fairly discernable in the statutory scheme." 28
Given the essence of due process, however, it is difficult to understand how
courts have upheld this interpretation and even § 701(a) itself.29 By enacting
§ 701(a), Congress essentially created an autonomous agency that would be
its own judge, jury, and executioner.o This provision plainly contradicts
what the Framers intended when they adopted the concept of separation of
powers within the Constitution." Wrongs such as these compelled the
Founders to sign the Declaration of Independence.3 2

28. See, e.g., Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1143 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. Lou Dobbs Tonight: Is the EPA Out of Control? (Fox Business television broadcast
Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1225418977001/is-the-epa-outof-control ("You've got an agency [EPA] here that answers to no one. They act as the judge,
the jury, and the executioner on whatever they want to do." (quoting Sen. James Risch (RID)).
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, selfappointed [sic], or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.").
32. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (listing the King's
tyrannical wrongs that disregarded, supplanted, or undermined legitimate governments and
laws and that concentrated power in the King).
[The King] has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent
to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.
He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of
Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
Consent of our legislatures.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our
constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts
of pretended Legislation:
For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:
For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and
altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:
For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested
with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
Id.
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This Note proposes that the laws and government officials of the United
States must adhere to the fundamental principle Chief Justice Marshall
referenced in Marbury v. Madison.3 3 Chief Justice Marshall asserted that
when legal rights are infringed, there must also be a legal remedy." Since
the infringement of legal rights nearly always involves a situation where
someone acts without proper authority or refuses to act when compelled to
do so by proper authority, a judicial determination of the infringing party's
jurisdiction must be an available legal remedy." Hence, the corollary to the
Marbury principle is that an agency cannot exercise federal jurisdiction over
private property without the availability of judicial review." Accordingly,
the courts should strike down as unconstitutional any statute that precludes
judicial review." Congress must also act to clear the murky legal waters by
amending the APA and the CWA to conform to the due process protections
guaranteed to property owners in the Constitution. The longer Congress

33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. Id. at 163 ("'In all other cases,' [Blackstone] says, 'it is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded."' (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*23)).
35. Id. at 162-66.
It follows then that the question, whether the legality of an act of the head of
a department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on
the nature of that act.
If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law
to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on [an executive branch]
officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts;
when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts;
he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and
cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments
are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the
will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that
their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned
by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a
right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
Id. at 165-66.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.").
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fails to take these steps, the longer property owners will be denied true due
process in disputes concerning whether their property is in fact subject to
CWA jurisdiction."
Part II of this Note summarizes the legislative history of the APA,
describes the pertinent provisions of the APA and the CWA, and provides
the background of Sackett v. EPA. Using Sackett as the feature case, Part III
demonstrates how the APA, the CWA, the environmental agencies, and the
courts have created and maintained an oppressive regime that threatens
private property owners such as the Sacketts. Finally, Part IV proposes
specific actions that the courts and Congress must take to re-conform our
legal system to the fundamental legal principles that comprise due process.
II. BACKGROUND

The issues in Sackett arise from the confluence of environmental law,
administrative law, and constitutional law. To fully appreciate the
significance of the issues presented in Sackett, one must have an
understanding of the Administrative Procedure Act," the Clean Water
Act,' the interplay between the two Acts, and the judiciary's interpretation
and application of them. This Part will examine the relevant laws and the
background of Sackett.
A. Administrative Compliance Orders,JudicialReview, and the Statutory
Scheme
The APA is the foundation of the administrative statutory scheme."
Congress structured the APA to largely exempt administrative agencies
from judicial review and to accommodate subsequent statutes addressing
certain administrative areas of regulation.42 The CWA, being a subsequent
statute that addresses the specific regulation of "waters of the United
States," builds on the APA's foundation." Consequently, one must interpret
the CWA in light of the APA."
38.
39.
40.
(2012).
41.
42.
43.
44.

See infra Part III.B.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 1558-59.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
See, e.g., id. §§ 554, 556.
See, e.g., id.
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1. The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA is the heart of administrative law. Author and law professor
George B. Shepherd described the APA as "the bill of rights for the new
regulatory state."" In 1946, toward the close of the New Deal era, Congress
passed the APA after a decade of debate and political struggles. 6 The
impact and significance of the APA cannot be overstated. Describing this
significance, Professor Shepherd wrote:
[T]he APA established the fundamental relationship between
regulatory agencies and those whom they regulate-between
government, on the one hand, and private citizens, business, and
the economy, on the other hand. The balance that the APA
struck between promoting individuals' rights and maintaining
agencies' policy-making flexibility has continued in force, with
only minor modifications, until the present. The APA's impact
has been large. It has provided agencies with broad freedom,
limited only by relatively weak procedural requirements and
judicial review, to create and implement policies in the many
areas that agencies touch: from aviation to the environment,
from labor relations to the securities markets. The APA
permitted the growth of the modern regulatory state.
In detailing the history of the APA, Professor Shepherd noted that the
key struggle over the APA involved the conservatives' desire to protect
individual rights through adequate procedures and judicial review and the
New Dealers' desire to increase agency "efficiency."4 8 "Efficiency" was
actually a New Dealer code word that "meant agencies' ability to implement
45. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 1558. "In a new era of expanded government, [the
APA] defined the relationship between government and governed," much as the Bill of
Rights did following the ratification of the Constitution. Id. at 1678.
46. See id. at 1558-61.
[Tihe fight over the APA was a pitched political battle for the life of the New
Deal. The more than a decade of political combat that preceded the adoption of
the APA was one of the major political struggles in the war between supporters
and opponents of the New Deal.
Id. at 1560.
47. Id. at 1558-59 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 1680. In 1983, Professor Berman noted that numerous fields of administrative
law, including environmental regulation, had achieved predominance over the prior
structure that deferred more to self-regulation and individual rights. BERMAN, supra note 4,
at 34.
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New Deal programs quickly, without interference from either cumbersome
procedural requirements or intrusive judicial review." 49
In contrast, conservatives sought "individual rights," which were
individuals' and businesses' rights to prevent an agency from
implementing New Deal programs unless the agency both
jumped through numerous procedural hoops and received the
blessing of a conservative federal judge-until late in the
Roosevelt administration, most federal judges were conservatives
who would often strike down New Deal programs. Strong
individual rights would hinder implementation of New Deal
programs because of both administrative and judicial procedural
delay and because of judicial rejection of the programs. 0
This historical background is critical to understanding not only the issues in
Sackett and similar cases but also how to resolve them.
One of the powers that the APA grants to an agency is the ability to issue
legally binding orders." The APA defines an order as "the whole or a part of
a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including
licensing."52 The CWA expands this power by granting the EPA the ability
to issue ACOs.S3 Regarding orders, including ACOs, the APA provides that
"[a] sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued
except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by
law."54
Sections 701-706 of the APA contain the provisions concerning judicial
review." The Supreme Court has recognized that the APA "embodies the
basic presumption of judicial review to one 'suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute."' 6 The APA further states that "[a]gency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is

Shepherd, supra note 22, at 1680.
Id.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(e), 558(b) (2012).
Id. § 551(6); see also id. § 701(b)(2).
See infra Part II.A.2.
5 U.S.C. § 558(b).
55. Id. §§ 701-706.
56. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702),
abrogatedon other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.""
Section 701, however, created two exceptions to this presumption if (1) a
particular subsequent statute, such as the CWA, "preclude[s] judicial
review," or (2) the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.""
2.

The Clean Water Act

Congress first passed the CWA in 1948, when it was originally known as
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or FWPCA." In 1972 and 1977,
Congress amended and recodified the CWA.60 Since 1977, when the Act
became commonly known as the CWA,6 1 the CWA has remained largely
unchanged. 2 In general, the CWA "[e]stablished the basic structure for
regulating pollutants discharges into the waters of the United States" and set
"quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters."" Included in the
definition of pollutants are rocks, sand, and dirt."4 In Sackett, the EPA's
ACO alleges that the Sacketts violated 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 65 This section
prohibits a person from discharging pollutants except as provided for by
law.66 Section 309 of the CWA also provides the EPA with several
enforcement options including the ability to seek administrative, civil, and
criminal penalties. 67
Along with these enforcement options, the CWA also gives the EPA
enforcement discretion. 68 Although the EPA has the option of bringing a
civil action right away, its favored method of enforcement is issuing an
57. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
58. Id. § 701. Defining what types of actions are committed to agency discretion is an
unsettled area of the law and the topic of considerable debate beyond the scope of this Note.
For a discussion of this exception, see Ronald M. Levin, UnderstandingUnreviewability in
AdministrativeLaw, 74 MINN. L. REv. 689 (1990).
59. ABA SECTION OF ENV'T, ENERGY, & RES., THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 6 (Mark
A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003).
60. Id.

61. History of the Clean Water Act,

EPA, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/

cwahistory.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012).
65. Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012).
67. Id. § 1319.

68. ABA SECTION OF ENV'T, ENERGY, & REs., supra note 59, at 223 & n.22.
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ACO pursuant to § 309(a). 9 A violation of an ACO itself also constitutes a
separate violation of the CWA and subjects the recipient to additional
penalties. 70 After issuing the ACO, the EPA can impose administrative
penalties,7' seek civil enforcement in the appropriate district court, 72 and
potentially bring criminal charges as well.
B. Sackett v. EPA
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sackett v. EPA7 1 is a prime example of the
problems inherent in the APA and the CWA. Judicial interpretations of
these statutes have further compounded the problems in them. While the

69. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 5-7, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4590831 at
*5-7; 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a).
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation of section [1311 of this title] . . . he shall
issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section or
requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b)
of this section.
Id. § 1319(a).
70. Id. § 1319(d) ("Any person who violates ... any order issued by the Administrator
under subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000
per day for each violation."). Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the EPA has increased
the maximum fine amount to $37,500. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2009).
71. Id. § 1319(g).
72. Id. § 1319(b), (d).
73. Id. § 1319(c).
74. Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
75. E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 218 (1994) (holding that the
Mine Safety and Health Act's "administrative structure was intended to preclude district
court jurisdiction over petitioner's claims"); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
341, 351-53 (1984) (holding that the respondents could not seek judicial review under the
APA of milk market orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture because Congress intended
to preclude judicial review) ("[W]here substantial doubt about the congressional intent
exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is
controlling. That presumption does not control in cases [where] the congressional intent to
preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible' in the detail of the legislative scheme."); S. Pines
Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The language, structure,
objectives, and history of the CWA, persuade us that Congress intended to preclude judicial
review."); Hoffman Grp., Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Congress has
impliedly precluded judicial review of a [CWA] compliance order except in an enforcement
proceeding.").
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Supreme Court's decision in Sackett did correct some of the lower courts'
interpretations, other problems remain.
1. Factual Background
In 2005, Mike and Chantell Sackett bought a lot in a subdivision near
Priest Lake, Idaho for $23,000." In preparation to build their family
residence, the Sacketts began filling their lot with dirt and gravel in April
and May of 2007.n Federal officials arrived and ordered the Sacketts to stop
because their lot contained a wetland subject to CWA jurisdiction. On
November 26, 2007, the EPA issued an ACO against the Sackets alleging
that the Sacketts had filled in a wetland subject to CWA jurisdiction
without a CWA § 404 permit.79 The ACO directed "the Sacketts to remove
the fill material and restore the Parcel to its original condition."o The ACO
also stated that failure to comply could result in "'civil penalties of up to
$32,500 per day of violation [or] ... administrative penalties of up to
$11,000 per day for each violation."' The cost to remove the fill material
was $27,000.82

Interestingly, the EPA had not required any of the Sacketts' neighbors to
get a § 404 permit to improve their properties.83 The Sacketts, however,
contended that they obtained all of the necessary building permits. 4 In fact,
even after the Sacketts checked to make sure that their property was not on
the EPA's online wetlands inventory," they received further oral
confirmation that a § 404 permit was not required after Mrs. Sackett
76. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141; Greg Stohr, Mike and Chantell Sackett vs. the EPA,
BLOOMBERG Bus.WK. (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mike-andchantell-sackett-vs-the-epa-0811201 1.html.
77. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141.
78. Stohr, supra note 76.
79. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141 & n.1. Section 404 governs the process for obtaining a
permit to legally fill or alter a wetland subject to CWA jurisdiction. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
80. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141.
81. Id. Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the EPA has since increased the maximum
penalty to $37,500. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2009). Because a violation of an ACO is separate from
the underlying statutory violation for which the ACO was issued, in the EPA's view, the fines
are effectively doubled for a potential maximum of $75,000 per day. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.
Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).
82. Fact Sheet, supranote 9, at 1.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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consulted with an Army Corps of Engineers official.86 After receiving the
ACO, the Sacketts also hired an engineer who concluded in his report that
the property did not contain wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction.17
Nonetheless, the EPA refused to grant the Sacketts a hearing or opportunity
to contest whether their lot was subject to CWA jurisdiction." The Sacketts
then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 9
2. Procedural History
After the Sacketts filed suit, the EPA quickly moved to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction." In a sparsely reasoned opinion, the court held,
in contrast to the Sacketts' contention, that the EPA's ACO was not
reviewable under the APA because it did not constitute final agency
action." Accordingly, the court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal and
considered the Sacketts' three grounds for challenging the validity of the
ACO. " The Sacketts contended that the ACO was "(1) arbitrary and
capricious under the... [APA], 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (2) issued without a
hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3)
issued on the basis of an 'any information available' standard that is
unconstitutionally vague."94 Recognizing that the CWA does not expressly
provide for the availability of pre-enforcement judicial review of an ACO,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether Congress prohibited such review by

86. Stohr, supra note 76. The Corps is the agency responsible for issuing permits
described in CWA § 404(a) and (d) to dredge or fill wetlands. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d)
(2012).
87. Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 2.
88. Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
89. Id.
90. Sackett v. EPA, No. 08-cv-185-N-EJL, 2008 WL 3286801, at *1 (D. Idaho Aug. 7,
2008), affd, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
91. Id. at *2. The court also found that the Sacketts had not carried their burden of
proving that the government had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit did not address this issue. See Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1147.
92. Sackett, 2008 WL 3286801, at *3.
93. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141.
94. Id.
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implication." The Ninth Circuit held that Congress intended to preclude
pre-enforcement judicial review of ACOs.96
The court then examined the Sacketts' due process claim." Interestingly,
the court found that "[t]he civil penalty provision of the CWA is 'not a
model of clarity.""' The court also recognized that "[i]f the CWA is read in
the literal manner the Sacketts suggest, it could indeed create a due process
problem."" Yet in spite of these recognitions, the court rejected this
interpretation of the CWA and held "that precluding pre-enforcement
judicial review of CWA compliance orders does not violate due process."'00
In reaching its conclusion, the court glossed over the Sacketts'
predicament: either comply without an opportunity to challenge the validity
of the ACO or remain in violation and risk mounting administrative, civil,
and possibly criminal penalties if the EPA decides to bring an enforcement
action in the district court.'o' The court highlighted an avenue of review
available to the Sacketts by noting that they "could seek a permit to fill their
property and build a house, the denial of which would be immediately
appealable to a district court under the APA." 02 The court also noted that if
the EPA brought an enforcement action, the district court, not the EPA,
would determine the civil penalties based on the six factors in § 309 of the
CWA.'03 Based on this reasoning, the court found that the CWA's provision
95. Id. at 1142-43.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1145 (quoting At. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d
1128, 1137 (11th Cir. 1990)).
99. Id. The Sacketts read the CWA to mean that they are at risk of incurring "substantial
financial penalties for violating the [ACO], even if they did not violate the CWA [itself], if
the EPA establishes in an enforcement proceeding that the [ACO] was validly issued based
on 'any information available.'" Id.
100. Id. at 1145, 1147.
101. Id. at 1146-47.
102. Id. at 1145-46 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 331.10 and 5 U.S.C. § 704). The EPA admits,
however, that the Corps rarely grants Section 404 permits under these circumstances. See
Brief for Respondents at 31-32, 50-51, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 10-1062),
2011 WL 5908950 at *31-32, *50-51. Moreover, "getting a CWA permit is an exhausting and
costly process. On average, such permits cost about $270,000 and take more than two years
to obtain." Timothy Sandefur, Compliance-or Else: The EPA's Compliance Order Regime
Creates a Hobson's Choice, REGULATION, Winter 2011-2012, at 8, 10, available at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-2.pdf
103. In assessing the amount of the penalty, courts "shall consider the seriousness of the
violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history
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for daily accrual of penalties for CWA violations did not violate due process
and affirmed the district court's decision."*
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari but reframed the question presented into two separate issues'0 :
(1) whether the APA precludes pre-enforcement judicial review of ACOs,
and (2) if the APA does preclude it, whether the unavailability of preenforcement judicial review is a violation of due process.106 Finding that the
APA does not preclude pre-enforcement judicial review, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case, clearing the way for the
Sacketts to proceed with their action against the EPA.'o
III. PROBLEM

While the Supreme Court's decision in Sackett is a victory for private
property rights, the extent of that victory remains to be seen. Given the
environmental agencies' response to past Supreme Court decisions, the
outlook is not promising.' Meanwhile, the struggle between individual
rights and agency "efficiency"' 9 continues in the environmental context.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's reframing of the questions presented
partially obscured the key issue of the environmental agencies' ability to
arbitrarily determine the extent of CWA jurisdiction.'o Additionally,
because the Supreme Court ruled in the Sacketts' favor on the first issue, it
was not required to consider the second issue, which is even more
important than the first. This Part evaluates both issues by examining the
Supreme Court's opinions in Sackett, by discussing the lost fundamental
principles of Marbury v. Madison,"' by demonstrating why jurisdiction is
of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the
economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may
require." Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1145-46 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)).
104. Id. at 1145,1147.
105. Damien M. Schiff, Sackett v. EPA: Compliance Orders and the Right of Judicial
Review, 11 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 113, 122 (2012). Damien Schiff was the counsel of record for
the Sacketts in Sackett v. EPA. Id. at n.*.
106. Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.granted, 131 S. Ct. 3092 (U.S. Jun.
28,2011) (No. 10-1062).
107. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
108. See infra Part III.A.3.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
110. Schiff, supra note 105, at 122.
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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critical to this discussion-especially in light of past abuses by the
environmental agencies-and by examining the essence of due process.
A. JudicialReview and the APA
The Sackett Court only decided the threshold issue of whether preenforcement judicial review of the ACO is available under the APA.1 2 The
Court repudiated the lower courts that had agreed with the EPA's basic
position that pre-enforcement judicial review is not available under the
CWA."3 In reaching this decision, the Court applied the APA's
presumption of judicial review and found no implicit preclusion in the
CWA scheme."' While this is an encouraging recognition by the Court, it
does little to resolve the underlying problem with the APA because it leaves
intact the notion that judicial review can be explicitly or implicitly
precluded."s Regrettably, the Court also failed to consider the fundamental
principles concerning judicial review outlined in Marbury v. Madison."'
Pre-enforcement judicial review is especially important given the current
existence of the administrative state and its acceptance by the three
branches of the United States Government. A proper understanding of
jurisdiction and its relationship to judicial review, however, would provide a
stronger and broader basis of relief for all private property owners
potentially threatened by the environmental agencies' overextension of
CWA jurisdiction.
1. The Supreme Court's Decision
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia"' began the Court's
analysis by considering whether the ACO constituted final agency action

112. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
116. According to Professor Jeffrey Tuomala, Chief Justice Marshall believed "that
judicial review is part and parcel of the judicial power." Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v.
Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 297, 310 (2010). Writers
addressing Marbury have erred when "they make a distinction between judicial power and
the power of judicial review, a distinction that Marshall did not make." Id. at 310 n.69.
117. It is worth noting that Justice Scalia's specialty is administrative law. Michael A.
Perino, Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 135, 135 (1987). From 1981-1982, he was the chairman of the American Bar
Association's Section of Administrative Law. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme
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under § 704 of the APA."' To answer this question, the Court analyzed the
finality of the order.119 Drawing on past precedent to determine finality, the
Court focused on three elements: (1) whether the EPA's ACO had
determined the Sacketts' rights or obligations; (2) whether "legal
consequences ... flow from issuance of the [ACO]"; and (3) whether "the
issuance of the [ACO] also marks the consummation of the agency's
decisionmaking process."l20 Answering each of these questions in the
affirmative, the Court found that the ACO constituted final agency

action. 12 1
The Court next considered the APA's other requirement that the
Sacketts had "no other adequate remedy in a court." 22 By noting that the
EPA must initiate a civil enforcement action for the matter to be reviewed
by a federal district court, the Court immediately recognized the Sacketts'
dilemma. 12 3 The Court specifically rejected the other avenue of review that
the Ninth Circuit had identified for the Sacketts:
But the Sacketts cannot initiate [the enforcement] process, and
each day they wait for the agency to drop the hammer, they
accrue, by the Government's telling, an additional $75,000 in
potential liability. The other possible route to judicial reviewapplying to the Corps of Engineers for a permit and then filing
suit under the APA if a permit is denied-will not serve either.
The remedy for denial of action that might be sought from one

Court: Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, SuP. CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
118. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
119. Id. at 1371-72.
120. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court rejected the
EPA's contention that the ACO was not final because it invited the Sacketts "to engage in
informal discussion" about the ACO since it "confer[red] no entitlement to further agency
review." Id. at 1372 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
continued, "The mere possibility that an agency might reconsider in light of 'informal
discussion' and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise final
agency action nonfinal." Id.
121. Id. at 1371-72.
122. Id. at 1372 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).
123. Id.
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agency does not ordinarily provide an "adequate remedy" for
action already taken by another agency.124
Having addressed § 704, the Court next considered whether the CWA
implicitly precluded judicial review as permitted by § 701.125 By glossing
over § 701, the Court yet again implicitly accepted its provisions and
skipped the opportunity to address the propriety of § 701. Starting with the
APA's presumption in favor of judicial review, the Court proceeded to
determine whether the presumption was "'overcome by inferences of intent
drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole." 26 In the Court's view, the
cases "on which the [EPA] relie[d] simply [we]re not analogous." 2 7 The
Court also dismissed the EPA's last argument that Congress authorized
ACOs to remedy inefficient enforcement of the CWA and that, if ACOs are
subject to judicial review, the EPA would be less likely to use them.128 Justice
Scalia responded:
That may be true-but it will be true for all agency actions
subjected to judicial review. The APA's presumption of judicial
review is a repudiationof the principle that efficiency of regulation
conquers all. And there is no reason to think that the Clean
Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of
regulated parties into "voluntary compliance" without the
opportunity for judicial review-even judicial review of the
question whether the regulated party is within the EPA's
jurisdiction. [ACOs] will remain an effective means of securing
prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is
no substantial basis to question their validity.12 9

124. Id. At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked the EPA's counsel Mr. Stewart
what he would do if he was in the Sackett's position. When Mr. Stewart began to mention the
option of applying for an after-the-fact § 404 permit, the Chief Justice interrupted him,
saying, "You wouldn't do that, right? You know you will never get an after-the-fact permit if
the EPA has sent you a compliance order saying you've got wetlands." Transcript, supra note
11, at 36-37.
125. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
126. Id. at 1373 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1374.
129. Id. (emphasis added). This passage reveals Justice Scalia's awareness of the APA's
history. See supra Part II.A.1.
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With that, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Sacketts
could seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the ACO under the APA
because the CWA does not preclude such review.130
The Court's decision marks a step in the right direction. Nonetheless,
many issues remain unresolved. Although this holding allows people and
entities like the Sacketts to challenge final agency actions by the
environmental agencies, there is nothing to prevent Congress from passing
an amendment to the CWA that explicitly precludes judicial review based
on § 701(a). 13' Thus, while the problem is alleviated, the threat § 701(a)

poses still lurks.132
Two succinct concurring opinions accompanied the unanimous
decision. Justice Ginsburg briefly highlighted that the Court was only
recognizing the Sacketts' right to challenge the EPA's jurisdiction over their
property.'33 She further noted that the Court had not decided whether the
Sacketts could challenge the terms and conditions of the ACO at the preenforcement stage.' Whether the Court's holding is actually that narrow is
questionable given its wording.'3 5 But even if Justice Ginsburg is correct, it
further highlights that the Court's solution does not do enough to vindicate
private property rights."'
Justice Alito's concurrence first scathingly rebuked the EPA's treatment
of the Sacketts and the enabling statutory and regulatory scheme."' He
130. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.

131. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
132. In considering the Supreme Court's decision, the Sacketts' attorney wrote,
Although the Court's opinion does not address this underlying jurisdictional
issue, it is fair to interpret the opinion as an acknowledgment that the law is not
clear, a fix has to be provided, and that the fix will come from the judiciary if
Congress or the agencies do not act.
Schiff, supra note 105, at 130.
133. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1374-75.
135. Id. at 1374 (majority opinion) ("We conclude that the compliance order in this case
is final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy other than APA review...."
(emphasis added)). The Sacketts' attorney believes that Justice Ginsburg's approach is what
future courts will apply to the Sackett decision. Schiff, supra note 105, at 134.
136. See infra Part IV.
137. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito also took the EPA's
counsel to task during oral argument:
Well, so what? Somebody from the EPA says we think that your backyard is a
wetlands; so, don't build. So, what do we -- what does the homeowner do,
having bought that property?
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remarked, "In a nation that values due process, not to mention private
property, such treatment is unthinkable.""' The rest of Justice Alito's
concurrence laments the deleterious effect of the current statutory and
regulatory scheme on private property rights and Congress's failure to do
anything about it.'13 He specifically calls on Congress to clear the muddied
waters by doing "what it should have done in the first place: provide a
reasonably clear rule regarding the reach of the Clean Water Act."'40
2. Marbury'sFundamental Principles
Marbury v. Madison is well-known in the legal profession as one of the
cornerstone cases of American jurisprudence.'' The narrow issues in the
case were whether Marbury had a right to his commission as Justice of the
Peace; if so, whether Marbury had a remedy under the laws of the United
States; and, if so, whether that remedy was a writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court.142 Chief Justice Marshall, however, took the opportunity to
broadly examine and expound on the nature of government power and
jurisdiction."' Chief Justice Marshall declared, "The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the

... Well, all right, I'm just going to put it aside as a nature preserve.
That makes the EPA's conduct here even more outrageous: We -- we think now
that this is wetlands that are -- that qualify; so, we're going to hit you with this
compliance order, but, you know, when we look into it more thoroughly in the
future, we might change our mind.
Transcript, supra note 11, at 38-39, 53.
138. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Gregory J. Roden, Unborn Children As ConstitutionalPersons, 25 ISSUEs L. & MED.
185, 209-10 (2010) (hailing Marbury v. Madison "as the very cornerstone of Supreme Court
jurisprudence"); Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells Be Eroded with Time?, 57
ME. L. REV. 117, 132 (2005) (declaring that Marbury v. Madison is "still one of the
cornerstones of jurisprudence"); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive,
JurisdictionStripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1043 (2007) (calling Marbury v. Madison a cornerstone of our whole
judicial system); see also Tuomala, supra note 116, at 297-98 & n.2 (noting that Marbury is
one of the first cases that law students study in a constitutional law course and that the
original Marbury decision is "the only Supreme Court case on display in the company of the
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution" at the National Archives).
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154 (1803).
143. See id. at 138-180.
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protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."'" Chief Justice
Marshall then affirmed the fundamental principle that Blackstone
recounted in his Commentaries, namely, that "it is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."' The
Supreme Court has affirmed these principles as recently as 1992.146 Later in
his opinion in Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall explained the jurisdiction of
an executive officer:
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on [an executive
branch] officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to
perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are
dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the
officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and
cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.'
Thus, based on this explanation, a government official (or entity) may not
lawfully affect legal rights without having proper jurisdiction over the
property or person.' This principle of jurisdiction is so basic that it is one
of the first components of a civil complaint.'49 Hence, the corollary to the
principle Marbury quotes from Blackstone is that the federal government
cannot exercise jurisdiction without the availability of judicial review.5 0
144. Id. at 163.
145. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).

146. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,66-67 (1992) (quoting Marbury,5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163, and 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).

147. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (emphasis added).
148. See id.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction .....
150. See Marbury,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66.
It follows then that the question, whether the legality of an act of the head of
a department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on
the nature of that act.
If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law
to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on [an executive branch]
officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts;
when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts;
he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and
cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
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While Marbury did not receive the remedy he sought, he did have the
opportunity to file suit and be heard by a court."' Until the Supreme
Court's decision in Sackett, the Sacketts and similarly situated property
owners had been denied even this opportunity.' The initial remedy that
they sought-to be heard and have a judge evaluate the factual and legal
basis for the EPA's jurisdictional determination-has finally been granted.
Nonetheless, the current state of affairs for property owners subject to the
EPA's imposition of CWA jurisdiction still leaves much to be desired.
Because the CWA's current structure is far removed from the foundational
principles in Marbury, the EPA has, and still can, "sport away the vested
rights""' of people like the Sacketts. '
3. The Environmental Agencies' History of Overextending CWA
Jurisdiction
Section 558(b) of the APA states that "[a] sanction may not be imposed
or a substantive rule or order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to
the agency and as authorized by law."' 5 The problem is that the exact extent
of the jurisdiction that Congress has delegated to the environmental

The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments
are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the
will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that
their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned
by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a
right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
151. See generally id.
152. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
153. Marbury,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
154. Indeed, less than two months after the Supreme Court handed down its decision, a news
article reported that the director of the EPA's water enforcement division commented that the
Sackett decision would have little impact on the EPA's actions: "'What's available after Sackett?
Pretty much everything that was available before Sackett,' Mark Pollins, director of EPA's water
enforcement division, said. [. .] 'Internally, it's same old, same old.' News Release: Senators Urge
EPA to Heed Supreme Court Decision, U.S. SENATOR MIKE CRAPo (May 31, 2012),

http://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/release_fuil.cfm?id=336914
(alteration
in
original) (citations omitted). Citing these comments, sixteen U.S. Senators wrote a letter
requesting an explanation. Id.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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agencies by the CWA is far from clear."' The agencies, however, have
decided to take matters into their own hands and make their own
jurisdictional determinations."' By doing so, the environmental agencies
have vastly overextended CWA jurisdiction over lands that do not even
contain surface water.'58
The Supreme Court has reprimanded the environmental agencies for
unreasonably overextending CWA jurisdiction in two recent cases: Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers" 9 ("SWANCC") and Rapanos v. United States." In SWANCC, a
consortium of municipalities sought to construct a waste disposal site at an
abandoned sand and gravel pit.' Due to several decades of nonuse, the
property contained some ponds that migratory birds used.'62 Realizing that
a Section 404 permit might be required to fill and alter some of these ponds,
the municipalities consulted with the Corps.' 3 The Corps responded that
under its "Migratory Bird Rule," the ponds on the mining site fell within
"the waters of the United States" language of the CWA because migratory
birds used the ponds." Later, the Corps denied the municipalities'
156. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The reach of the Clean Water Act
is notoriously unclear.").
157. The Corps and the EPA have entered into various agreements delineating the role
each of them would have in implementing and enforcing the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)
(2012) (providing that the EPA may override permits granted by the Corps); MARGARET
"PEGGY" STRAND & LOWELL M. ROTHSCHILD, WETLANDS DESKBOOK 14-15 (3d ed. 2009);
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the EPA, U.S. ENVTL.
(last
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/enfoma.cfm
visited Mar. 25, 2013).
158. Virginia S. Albrecht & David Isaacs, Wetlands Jurisdiction and Judicial Review, 7
NAT. RES. & ENv'T, no. 1, Summer 1992, at 31. The authors stated,
[The] EPA expanded federal authority ... by continuously redefining wetlands
delineation methodology to reach progressively drier areas. The culmination
was a 1989 manual that defined certain areas as having wetlands hydrology if
the water table rose to eighteen inches beneath the surface for seven days a year.
Thus, an area did not even have to be wet at the surface to qualify as a wetland.
Id.
159. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) (5-4 decision).
160. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (4-1-4 decision).
161.
162.
163.
164.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164-65.
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application for a § 404 permit.' 5 Disagreeing with the Corps's decision and
its jurisdictional determination, the municipalities filed suit pursuant to
§ 701 of the APA and asked the district court to invalidate the Migratory
Bird Rule.'" The district court granted summary judgment for the Corps,
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 7
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Congress did not intend for
the CWA to extend to isolated bodies of water, such as the ponds at issue.'6 "
Furthermore, the Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, stating that it
was not supported by the text of the CWA.'6 ' The Court noted that to allow
the Migratory Bird Rule to stand "would result in a significant impingement
of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use." 70
Nevertheless, since the Corps issued the Migratory Bird Rule in 1986, the
Corps had impinged on states' rights for fifteen years.' 7 '
Just a few years later, the Corps and similar issues were again before the
Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. Army Corps of
Engineers.721In Rapanos, the Corps successfully pursued civil and criminal
penalties against the petitioners for allegedly filling in wetlands without a
§ 404 permit.7 The Corps contended that the sometimes-saturated fields
that Rapanos sought to develop were "waters of the United States"'7 even
though "[t]he nearest body of navigable water was 11 to 20 miles away."' 75
In Carabell, the petitioners filed an action under the APA against the Corps
for denying them a § 404 permit to fill in an isolated wetland, which only
occasionally overflowed into a ditch that eventually connected to a lake

165. Id. at 165.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 165-66.
168. Id. at 174.
169. Id. at 167.
170. Id. at 174.
171. See id. at 164. The Court further noted, "The Corps issued the 'Migratory Bird Rule'
without following the notice and comment procedures outlined in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553," providing yet another example of the environmental
agencies' arrogance. Id. at 164 n.1.
172. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (4-1-4 decision). These two casesRapanosand Carabell-were consolidated into Rapanos.
173. Id. at 719-21.
174. Id. at 719-20 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), the CWA's broad and vague definition of
the waters subject to its jurisdiction).
175. Id. at 720.
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about one mile away."' Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit held for
the Corps.' The Supreme Court considered "whether these wetlands
constitute 'waters of the United States' under the [CWA], and if so, whether
the Act is constitutional."'7 This determination hinged on the validity of
the Corps's regulations, which defined "waters of the United States" as
including wetlands adjacent to interstate navigable waters. 79
The Court ruled against the Corps in both cases, finding that "[t]he
Corps' expansive interpretation of the [phrase] 'the waters of the United
States' is . . . not 'based on a permissible construction of the statute."""s

Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia put forth a two-part test.'' First, the
channels adjacent to the wetlands must contain a water of the United States,
which he defined as "a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters."' 82 Second, "the wetland [must have]
a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to
determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."' The plurality
also noted that following the SWANCC decision the Corps failed to
"significantly revise its theory of federal jurisdiction under [the CWA]" and
continued to circumvent the Court's ruling and guidance.' Justice Scalia
then excoriated the Corps, writing that it "exercises the discretion of an
enlightened despot."' 5 He continued,
The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small
part of the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use
that has occurred under the Clean Water Act-without any
change in the governing statute-during the past five
Presidential administrations. In the last three decades, the Corps
176. Id. at 730.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 724 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3).
180. Id. at 739, 757 (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 742. In the 4-1-4 split, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito
joined Justice Scalia. Id. at 718. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but proposed a
"'significant nexus"' test based on earlier precedent. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
167 (2001)).
182. Id. at 742.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 726.
185. Id. at 721.
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and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have
interpreted their jurisdiction over "the waters of the United
States" to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the
United States-including half of Alaska and an area the size of
California in the lower 48 States. And that was just the
beginning. The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over virtually
any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit-whether
man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or
ephemeral-through which rainwater or drainage may
occasionally or intermittently flow. On this view, the federally
regulated "waters of the United States" include storm drains,
roadside ditches, ripples of sand in the desert that may contain
water once a year, and lands that are covered by floodwaters once
every 100 years. Because they include the land containing storm
sewers and desert washes, the statutory "waters of the United
States" engulf entire cities and immense arid wastelands. In fact,
the entire land area of the United States lies in some drainage
basin, and an endless network of visible channels furrows the
entire surface, containing water ephemerally wherever the rain
falls. Any plot of land containing such a channel may potentially
be regulated as a "water of the United States.""
SWANCC, Rapanos, and now Sackett demonstrate that the
environmental agencies"' cannot be trusted to define the jurisdiction of the
CWA. It is unfortunate that Congress has left this power in the
environmental agencies' hands, especially since the Supreme Court has
been only an occasional check on this power-and a limited one at that.'
Additionally, the environmental agencies continue to find ways to
circumvent the Supreme Court's corrections by arbitrary enforcement, by
promulgating new regulations defining which waters-or wet or even dry
ground, as the case may be-are subject to CWA jurisdiction, or by simply

186. Id. at 722.
187. Although the EPA was not a party in SWANCC and Rapanos, and the Corps was not
a party in Sackett, the EPA and the Corps cooperate on CWA implementation, permitting,
and enforcement. See supra note 157.
188. For further examples of the environmental agencies' incorrigibleness, see Wetlands,
supra note 5, at 141-49.
189. See supranote 154.
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disregarding the Supreme Court's decisions altogether.'o Such agency
actions illustrate the necessity of congressional intervention.
B. Due Process
The second question presented in Sackett was whether the unavailability
of pre-enforcement judicial review is a violation of due process."' As noted
above, the Supreme Court did not reach this issue. 9 2 While the Supreme
Court's holding is a step in the right direction, the relief that it provides is
limited.' Hence, private property owners' due process rights are still
subject to infringement.
1. The Essence of Due Process
Due process is a fundamental concept deeply rooted in the common law
tradition.'" In Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story traced the
history of the phrase "due process of law" back to the Magna Carta and
wrote that "this clause in effect affirms the right of trial according to the
process and proceedings of the common law." '
190. See supra notes 5, 154, 158.
191. Sackett v. EPA, 131 S. Ct. 3092 (Jun. 28, 2011) (mem.).
192. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371, 1374 (2012).
193. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that "[tihe Court's decision provides a
modest measure of relief" and that most property owners are left "with little practical
alternative but to dance to the EPA's tune").
194. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1783 (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 1833).
195. Id. Expounding further, Justice Story continued:
[The Due Process Clause] is but an enlargement of the language of magna
charta, "nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittimus, nisi per legalejudicium
parium suorum, vel per legem terrae," neither will we pass upon him, or
condemn him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land. Lord Coke says, that these latter words, per legem terrae (by the law of the
land,) mean by due process of law, that is, without due presentment or
indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto by due process of the
common law. So that this clause in effect affirms the right of trial according to
the process and proceedings of the common law.
Id. Professor Berman wrote, "'Due process of law' is, in fact, a fourteenth-century English
phrase meaning natural law." BERMAN, supra note 4, at 12. Accordingly, he concludes that
"natural-law theory is written into the positive law of the United States." Id. Given this
background, the root problem of the environmental agencies' enforcement of the CWA
involves not only a struggle between private property rights and agency efficiency but also
the respective bodies of law from which these opposing ideas ultimately originate: natural
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Although the Supreme Court has held that "[d]ue process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,"' 96
this does not mean that the principles of due process change over time.
Rather, this flexibility is merely a recognition that the principles of due
process are portable and applicable in whatever context may be at hand. 9 7
Indeed, the Court has consistently recognized certain themes as inherent in
due process. In 1863, a few years before the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, the Court declared, "Common justice requires that no man shall
be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity
to make his defence."' More than one hundred years later, the Court
affirmed this principle by stating that "the central meaning of procedural
due process [is] clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to
be heard.'"' 9 In Armstrong v. Manzo,200 the Court further recognized that
"[a] fundamental requirement of due process is 'the opportunity to be
heard.' It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner."201 Additionally, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the
Supreme Court identified three factors for evaluating due process claims:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function

law (i.e., the law of nature) and positive law respectively. For further discussion of the law of
nature, see generally id. and Tuomala, supra note 116.
196. Mathews v. Eldrigde, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. The author disagrees with the following formulation from the Mathews Court:
"[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,
the author agrees with Professor Berman that due process derives from fixed principles
contained in natural law that are equally applicable to time, place, and circumstances. See
BERMAN, supra note 4, at 12. The fact that positive law has established an administrative
regime does not mean that due process must conform to the procedures of that regime. On
the contrary, the administrative law regime must conform to the enduring principles of due
process.
198. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
199. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 233).
200. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
201. Id. at 552 (citation omitted).
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involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.2 02
Not only do all of these statements demonstrate that, over the past two
centuries, the Court has held a fairly consistent view of due process, but
they also generally reflect the concept of due process that Justice Story
espoused 2 03 and comport with the principles articulated in Marbury.204
Against this historical backdrop, it is difficult to understand how the
courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Sackett, continue to hold that a statute
can preclude judicial review.20 5 As Professor Jonathan Adler rightly
observed, "What should be clear ... is that the right to be heard cannot be
meaningful if the government is free to penalize it."1206 Moreover,
administrative agencies are not exempt from the requirement of due
process:
The Supreme Court has recognized that an administrative action
need not, by itself, deprive a landowner of title or impose direct
financial consequences in order to amount to a cognizable
deprivation for due process purposes. In Connecticut v. Doehr,
for instance, the Court explained that "even the temporary or
partial impairments to property rights that attachments, liens,
and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due
process protection." On this basis, lower courts have found that
even nonpossessory attachments are sufficient to trigger due
process protections.2 07
The Supreme Court's decision in Sackett reversed this flawed mindset in
the context of the CWA. Still, it is difficult to comprehend how Congress
and the judiciary have allowed the foundation for preclusion-§ 701 of the
APA-to stand for several decades.2 08 As the administrative state has
become more established and accepted, however, one can sense the struggle
202. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
203. STORY,supra note 194, § 1783.
204. See supra Part III.A.2.
205. Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
206. Wetlands, supra note 5, at 158.
207. Id. at 157 (footnotes omitted) (citing Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991));
Pinsky v. Duncan, 898 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] nonpossessory attachment of real estate
deprives the owner of a constitutionally protected property interest under the fourteenth
amendment.").
208. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
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between agency efficiency and individual rights. 20 9 This tension is evident
both in the Court's shifting view of the historical understanding of due
process and also in its recognition of administrative review as an adequate
substitute for judicial review in some cases. 21 0 The Court's traditional view
of due process is a far cry from the due process, or rather the lack of due
process, that the Sacketts received prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Sackett. Regarding the Sacketts' plight, Justice Alito aptly wrote, "In a
nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such
treatment is unthinkable.""
IV. SOLUTION
Because the Supreme Court's scope of review in Sackett was limited, its
decision provided only a limited, incomplete solution to the problem of
reconciling due process rights and the CWA enforcement scheme. Even if
the scope of review in Sackett had been broader, the Supreme Court still
could not have completely fixed the problem; legislative action is also
required. In future cases, the Supreme Court could force congressional
action by fixing the problem to the extent that it can by striking down
unconstitutional provisions of the APA and CWA. Nevertheless, until the
Court hears another case raising these issues, the solution belongs
completely to Congress. Unfortunately, Congress will likely act only if there
is sufficient public pressure. Since few Americans outside of government
and the legal profession are even aware of the APA's existence, let alone its
role in sustaining the current administrative scheme, it is unlikely that the
public will call for Congress to amend the APA. Thus, the Supreme Court
and Congress should both take action to address these problems. With this
understanding, this Note proposes both judicial and legislative action.
A. JudicialSolution
The Sackett decision has paved the way for pre-enforcement judicial
review under the APA of some challenges to environmental agencies'
enforcement of the CWA.212 As Justice Alito noted, however, while "[t]he
Court's decision provides a modest measure of relief," most property
209. See supra Part II.A.1.
210. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976) (evaluating the adequacy of
administrative procedures for terminating social security disability benefits).
211. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 1374.
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owners are left "with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA's
tune."2 1 3 The Court's decision leaves the underlying due process threats
contained in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) and in the CWA's enforcement scheme
untouched. 2 14 Although unlikely to do so given the Sackett decision, the
Court would be within its authority to strike down these statutes for
violating due process: § 701(a) for permitting preclusion of judicial review
and the CWA for permitting the accumulation of highly unreasonable
fines.21 5 With or without judicial action, Congress must act to fully protect
private property and to uphold due process. In the future, however, the
Supreme Court can provide the impetus and should therefore do its part.
1. The EPA Cannot Exercise CWA Jurisdiction Without the
Availability of Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review.
The Supreme Court must return to the fundamental principle in
Marbury that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ...
whenever that right is invaded."2 16 In the context of the CWA, the rights at
stake are property and due process rights, and the remedy that parties, like
the Sacketts, seek is a judgment in their favor, which requires judicial
review. Furthermore, the Court must return to the corollary understanding
of judicial review and recognize that an agency may not exercise federal
jurisdiction over property without the availability of judicial review-not
just judicial review limited to final agency action.21 ' Therefore, it follows
that the Court must strike down as unconstitutional any statute that
precludes judicial review. This is especially true for jurisdictional disputes.
Applied specifically to the issue in Sackett, these principles lead to the
213. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring). As the Sacketts' counsel has noted,
It is thus conceivable that the EPA will argue that the Court's decision does not
make all compliance orders subject to judicial review, particularly if the agency
changes its position on what an order's impacts are or if the EPA institutes a
formal post-issuance administrative process. Thus, if the EPA were to change
its position on the legal impacts of compliance orders, or if it were to institute a
post-issuance administrative appeal process, then a reanalysis of the finality
question would be warranted.
Schiff, supra note 105, at 134. Additionally, "The decision's application to other agency
actions under the Clean Water Act is not entirely clear." Id.
214. 5 U.S.C. § 701 ("This chapter applies . . . except to the extent that-(1) statutes
preclude judicial review. . . .").
215. See supra Part III.A.1.
216. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).

217. See supra Part III.A.2; see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
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following conclusion: the EPA cannot exercise federal CWA jurisdiction
over the Sacketts' property without the availability of judicial review. If the
courts would have merely applied fundamental principles regarding judicial
review and jurisdiction, much of the Sacketts' problem would have been
remediated. Rather than relying on the Constitution, however, the Court
relied on the relevant statutes to reach its conclusion.218 Consequently, the
Court's holding, while similar to the conclusion proposed above, was much
narrower because it applies only to final agency action, as set forth in the
APA, but not to an assertion of jurisdiction in violation of fundamental
principles of jurisdiction and judicial review. 219
Permitting agencies to assert jurisdiction when there is no judicial review
not only allows the agency to exercise absolute authority over its realm of
influence but also gives the agency the power to define the extent of its realn
of influence with virtual impunity. Lest one should scoff that the
environmental agencies would never attempt to overextend their
jurisdiction and skirt the Court's reprimands and corrections, one needs
look no further than to the facts of Rapanos220 and SWANCC. 221'Currently,
the only potential check on the extension of jurisdiction by these agencies is
Congress-which created the problem in the first place by abdicating this

218. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
219. Id.
220. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (4-1-4 decision) (rejecting the
Corps's assertion of CWA jurisdiction over private property containing alleged wetlands as
too attenuated to constitute waters of the United States under the CWA).
221. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) (5-4 decision). In his concurring opinion in Rapanos, Chief Justice Roberts
recounted,
[In SWANCC,] this Court rejected the position of the Army Corps of
Engineers on the scope of its authority to regulate wetlands under the Clean
Water Act .... The Corps had taken the view that its authority was essentially
limitless; this Court explained that such a boundless view was inconsistent with
the limiting terms Congress had used in the Act ....
... Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in
SWANCC, and providing guidance meriting deference under our generous
standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the
scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat for the agency.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757-58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted); see id. at 758 n.*.
These decisions illustrate that although the agencies have suffered defeats by the U.S.
Supreme Court, they still find ways to maneuver around the Court's decisions. Hence, the
only real check on their power is Congress.
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kind of power to the environmental agencies. 2 2 2 The EPA and the Corps do
indeed act like "enlightened despots."22 3
Interestingly, the APA lends support to the view that there are bounds to
federal agencies' jurisdiction. Section 558(b) provides that an agency may
not issue a substantive rule or an order "except within jurisdiction delegated
to the agency and as authorized by law."224 Despite the Supreme Court's
rulings, this provision has had little effect on the environmental agencies'
boundless view of jurisdiction.2 2 5 In the future, the Supreme Court should
clarify and expand its ruling in Sackett to provide that judicial review is
available for any agency action, final or not, that attempts to assert CWA
jurisdiction. The Court should also strike § 701(a) as unconstitutional in
order to foreclose any opportunity for explicit preclusion by an amendment
to the CWA.
2. The CWA Enforcement Scheme Violates Due Process.
The Supreme Court should also address the CWA's enforcement scheme.
As the Sacketts' counsel has argued, when the provision granting the "only
chance at review (which is not even guaranteed) under § 309(b) requires
[the Sacketts] to violate the order and invite an enforcement action, thereby
running the risk of $37,500 per day in fines indefinitely," the provision must
be found unconstitutional as a violation of due process. 226 The Sacketts
supported their position with the Supreme Court's principle in Ex parte
Young.227 In Ex parte Young, the Court held that "judicial review is
constitutionally inadequate if it can be obtained only by running the risk of
significant civil or criminal liability, and if judicial review cannot otherwise
be had while complying." 228 While some may argue that changing the

222. See supra Part H.A.
223. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721; see supra note 154.
224. 5 U.S.C. § 558 (2012).
225. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757-58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The EPA disclosed its view
of virtually unlimited jurisdiction when it stated that the Sacketts face their predicament of
potentially crippling fines or costly compliance "only because they discharged fill on their
property without first seeking a permit or consulting with EPA or the Corps." Brief for
Respondents, supra note 102, at *12. By implication, this means that virtually anyone
planning to alter real property must consult with the EPA or the Corps lest there be some
unknown wetland present that only their experts can identify.
226. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 10, at *36.
227. Id. at *15 (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
228. Id. (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 148).
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CWA's enforcement scheme would allow bad faith violators to continue to
pollute waters without an immediate penalty, the EPA still has the ability to
seek an immediate injunction.22 9
Moreover, the amicus brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America provides revealing insight into the EPA's mindset and
why ACOs are its favored enforcement tool for environmental violations.2 30
According to the Chamber, "the sheer scope, and abusive nature, of EPA's
efforts to bypass traditional remedies are startling."23 1
EPA[] ... issu[es] up to 3,000 orders annually under the CWA-

nearly 60 per week. As another example, EPA has formalized a
CERCLA
[Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act] enforcement policy under
which it "typically will compel private-party response through
unilateral orders."
Indeed, EPA no longer goes to court to seek cleanup orders
under CERCLA. Instead, it has issued over 1,700 aptly named
Unilateral Administrative Orders ("UAOs") [analogous to ACOs
under the CWA] to more than 5,400 companies-averaging
"approximately six UAOs to nineteen [companies] every month."
When there is an actual emergency, EPA will not issue a
unilateral order; instead, it will clean up a site and then seek
compensation from responsible parties. That makes the
inversion of normal due process principles all the more
remarkable-EPA circumvents traditional remedies in favor of

[T]o impose upon a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision
of such a question (no prior hearing having ever been given) only upon the
condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines, as
provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and
thus prevent any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by
the acts are not too low, and therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious
between a case where the validity of the act depends upon the existence of a fact
which can be determined only after investigation of a very complicated and
technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject requiring
no such investigation, and over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is
complete in any event.
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 148.
229. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (2012).
230. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 69, at *5-7.
231. Id. at *5-6.
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unilateral orders only when there is no emergency, and thus no
excuse for departing from traditional due process protections.
And EPA does so for the very purpose of coercing recipients
into surrendering their due process rights. In a recent lawsuit ...
EPA was forced to . . . reveal that EPA actually trains its

personnel to make the terms of unilateral orders "ugly, onerous,
and tough" and "very unpleasant," in order to coerce settlements.
EPA's internal documents further confirm that EPA seeks to
threaten recipients with games of "Russian Roulette," so as to
further coerce their entry into "'voluntary' decrees."23
The Sacketts' counsel also pointed out that
the fact that the Sacketts' piecemeal plight is not unusual is one
reason why the EPA can often take a cavalier attitude in
enforcement: The agency has vastly greater technical and
litigation resources than the average compliance order recipient
and stands to lose much less than a resolute compliance order
recipient.2 33
In the month following the Supreme Court's decision in Sackett, the EPA
was embroiled in an unrelated public controversy. A YouTube video that
went viral revealed an EPA official's explanation of the EPA's enforcement
strategy for alleged violators of environmental statutes and regulations:
figurative crucifixion."'
In a talk to colleagues about methods [ofJ EPA enforcement,
Armendariz[, a regional director for the EPA appointed by
President Obama,] can be seen saying, "The Romans used to
conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They'd go into a
little Turkish town somewhere, they'd find the first five guys they
saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town
was really easy to manage for the next few years."
And not only has Armendariz talked about crucifying oil
companies, he's tried to do it.23 5

232. Id. at *6-7 (citations omitted).
233. Schiff, supra note 105, at 138.
234. Christopher Helman, EPA Official Not Only Touted "Crucifying"Oil Companies, He
Tried It, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2012, 12:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman
/2012/04/26/epa-official-not-only-touted-crucifying-oil-companies-he-tried-it/.
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Given this attitude and strategy, it is little wonder that the EPA prefers to
issue onerous ACOs mandating costly compliance and to allow potentially
exorbitant fines to accumulate for anyone who does not comply. Moreover,
the EPA has a tactical advantage over those issued an ACO, as evidenced by
the Sacketts' dilemma. Accordingly, the Supreme Court needs to strike the
provisions of § 309 allowing for the accumulation of fines before judicial
review of an ACO.236
B. Legislative Solution
Given the limited scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Sackett,
Congress will need to take action to completely resolve the problem it
created by passing § 701(a) of the APA and § 309 of the CWA and leaving
undefined the phrase "the waters of the United States."
1. Judicial Review and the APA
As stated above, one of the roots of the problem is the APA's
unconstitutional allowance for preclusion of judicial review in § 701(a).
Because the Supreme Court has failed to strike down this provision,
Congress must move immediately to repeal this provision. To remove all
doubt on the issue, Congress should replace § 701(a) with a section
explicitly providing that judicial review cannot be precluded. This would
emphasize the proper understanding of judicial review as presented in
2 37
Marbury.
2.

The CWA Enforcement Scheme and ACOs

The second part of this legislative solution requires Congress to amend
the CWA. First, Congress must clearly define the amorphous phrase "the
waters of the United States." Without a clear definition of what kinds of
property contain "the waters of the United States," many property owners
do not even have constructive notice that the CWA may apply to their
property. As demonstrated by the cases discussed above, allowing the
environmental agencies to determine what property comes under CWA
jurisdiction has been an utter disaster.23 8 As Justice Alito noted, Congress
needs to "provide a reasonably clear rule."2 39

236. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2012).
237. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
238. See supra Part III.A.
239. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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Congress must also bring the entire CWA into compliance with due
process, particularly the enforcement scheme. The new sections should
provide that before the EPA can issue an ACO, the EPA must provide some
form of formal notice.24 In cases where the potential harm is imminent or
poses great danger to the protected public interest, the EPA may seek a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") or an injunction.24 1 Such a provision
would satisfy the notice requirement of due process.
The new section should also provide that the EPA may issue ACOs only
to order a party to cease actions that pose environmental harm, not to order
the party to take action to remedy environmental harm. This would
eliminate the problem of accumulating fines unless the ACO recipient
continues to act, in which case the recipient should face the threat of fines.
Additionally, the ACOs should only remain effective for a specified period,
such as sixty days.24 2 Furthermore, the EPA should not be able to issue a
new ACO for the same alleged violation or subsequent alleged violations of
the same nature, nor should it be able to extend the ACO "unless the [EPA]
brings an action . . . before the expiration of that period." 243 During this
time, the EPA must make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute if the
recipient of the ACO can demonstrate that the EPA is in error.
Moreover, the EPA may seek a TRO or preliminary injunction at any
time and in lieu of an ACO. Thus, if the EPA believes that the situation
requires an order lasting longer than sixty days, then it must seek a TRO or
preliminary injunction. This would provide the affected party with the
procedural protections contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and would ultimately provide an opportunity to contest the EPA's
allegation before the appropriate federal court. Additionally, if the EPA
believes that the alleged violator needs to take certain actions to protect the
alleged wetlands in question, then it may do so only through court action.
In effect, this solution would relegate the EPA's use of ACOs to its proper
place of dealing with less serious situations and force the EPA to address
allegations of more serious violations through the judicial system. This
solution removes any due process violations or concerns that exist in the
240. But cf 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2012) (allowing the EPA to issue an ACO without notice
to the affected party).
241. FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (authorizing courts to issue injunctions and temporary restraining
orders and establishing the procedures).
242. Under the Clean Air Act, ACOs issued by the EPA for air pollution violations are
only valid for sixty days "unless the [EPA] brings an action ... before the expiration of that
period." 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (2012).
243. Id.

2013]

SACKETT V. EPA

367

current enforcement regime, provides quicker resolution of wetlands
disputes, and still provides the EPA with enforcement options and
flexibility.
V. CONCLUSION

The Sackett case presents a current example of how the EPA is abusing
the power that Congress granted it by the CWA. While preserving a clean
and healthful environment is an important part of responsible stewardship,
preserving individual property rights is an equally, if not more important,
goal-one that patriot blood has been spilled to protect.2" Chief Justice
Marshall put it well when he stated in Marbury, "The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not
of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 45 Congress faces
a choice: either passively sit on its hands and let the EPA and the Corps
have free rein in their over-aggressive crusade against property owners or
intervene by standing up for the people that elected it and by reining in
these agencies. Congress has abdicated its responsibility for setting
environmental policy to the EPA and other agencies and has left these
agencies and the courts to work out the conflicts. But these conflicts affect
the very core of property rights and are too significant and fundamental to
be left in the environmental agencies' unclean hands with only occasional,
244. Wetlands, supra note 5, at 164-65.
The reach and force of federal environmental statutes challenge traditional
conceptions of limited government power. Property rights, in particular, are
routinely compromised in the name of environmental protection that extends
far beyond statutory bounds. Were that not bad enough, such incursions are
often for naught, as those regulatory programs least friendly to owners are
often those least effective at advancing environmental values. Imposing
regulatory burdens on private landowners in the name of species conservation,
for example, can actually undermine the conservation of endangered species.
When those landowners who own potential species habitat are burdened with
land-use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act, they become less likely
to cooperate with conservation efforts. At the extreme, landowners respond to
the economic incentives such regulatory schemes create and take preemptive
action to avoid regulatory constraints in the future-at the expense of habitat
for endangered species. At the same time, promising nonregulatory means of
advancing environmental protection-means that do not raise the same sorts of
due process concerns-remain largely ignored.
Id. at 163-64 (footnotes omitted).
245. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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minor corrections from the courts. If judicial review of the environmental
agencies' actions is not broadened to its lawful extent, then agency
efficiency will have triumphed over property rights and due process.
Congress must act. The environmental agencies must not be allowed to
continue to "sport away the vested rights" of the people.24

246. Id. at 166.

